Local business profits respond to local business tax (LBT) rates that vary across municipalities. We estimate that a 1% increase in the LBT rate decreases the LBT base by 0.45%, based on the universe of German LBT return files, which include corporations and unincorporated businesses. However, the fiscal equalization scheme largely compensates municipalities for the loss in the LBT base when they increase the LBT rate. Our estimates suggest that using tax revenue data instead of tax return data, as commonly done in the literature, results in a significant bias of the elasticity away from zero.
INTRODUCTION
When governments change corporate and other business tax rates, the profits of firms may respond in two ways. First, companies may change their real economic activity. For example, an increase in tax rates may create disincentives for investment and effort, or it may induce firms to move part of their activity to other jurisdictions with lower taxes, or even to relocate entirely. Second, higher tax rates may increase incentives to engage in tax planning in order to legally avoid or even illegally evade taxes by shifting or hiding book profits. The change in the tax base and thus in tax revenues is determined by the sum of both adjustment channels.
In this paper, we focus on local business taxation, where each municipality is free to choose its own tax rate. Local business taxes warrant attention for several reasons. First, municipalities compete for the local tax base. Local tax competition may be expected to be fiercer than the more often studied international tax competition because the barriers for reallocation of business activities are considerably lower within a country, where the language, legal framework, and culture are the same and reallocation distances may be minimal. Second, in Germany, the country analyzed in this paper, the definition of the local business tax (LBT) base (i.e., business profits with some adjustments) is the same in all municipalities, for example, with respect to depreciation rules, deductibility of financing expenses and research expenditures. Divergent tax base definitions typically create empirical issues in multinational settings. At the same time, local business taxes provide substantial variation in tax rates, which facilitates empirical identification of the effects. In Germany, there are about 12,000 municipalities with varying LBT rates which also change over time. Between 2001 and 2004 , about a quarter of the municipalities adjusted their LBT rates. Third, there is an ongoing debate on reforming the federal structure of municipality financing and the fiscal equalization scheme in Germany as well as in other countries.
Therefore, we estimate the elasticity of the LBT base with respect to the LBT rate. The elasticity of the tax base comprises both, adjustments in real and book profits. This elasticity determines the extent to which a tax cut will be self-financed through an increase in the tax base and is thus of great importance in forecasting changes in tax revenues induced by tax reforms. Moreover, as emphasized by the new tax responsiveness literature (for a survey, see Saez et al., 2012) , the elasticity of taxable income accounts for various behavioral responses to taxation and may therefore more accurately reflect the efficiency cost of taxation than narrower measures of taxpayer response under certain assumptions (for a critical assessment, see Chetty, 2009 ). 1 The elasticity of taxable income seems even more relevant for the analysis of business taxes addressed in this paper than for the personal income tax (PIT) because firms may have greater scope for adjustment and tax avoidance than workers.
The context of local business taxation is also interesting because regional externalities arise. A large elasticity of the local tax base in absolute terms indicates that at least one of two adjustment reactions are strong. The first reaction is that firms respond to a tax rate cut by shifting real or book profits to the low tax municipality, away from other jurisdictions. This implies horizontal externalities, because the local jurisdiction does not consider the change in other jurisdictions' tax revenues in its optimization. The second adjustment is that firms reduce their total real economic activity or overall book profits when the tax rate increases. This implies vertical externalities, because the optimizing municipality does not internalize effects on higher level tiers of government, for example, a loss in corporate tax revenues on the national level as a result of an increase in the LBT rate.
An additional motivation for estimating the elasticity of the LBT base is that this elasticity determines the strength of the incentive effects induced by federal fiscal equalization schemes that use the local taxing power as indicated by the local tax base to determine the size of financial transfers (Buettner, 2006; Egger et al., 2010) . In Germany, the fiscal equalization scheme between municipalities (within a federal state) mitigates the local tax competition for the LBT base. For example, when a municipality increases its LBT rate, the LBT base is expected to decreasethe elasticity to be estimated here describes the extent of this adjustment. This diminishes the taxing power of the jurisdiction, which entitles it to receive larger financial transfers. 2 The fiscal equalization scheme thus makes 1. Recent papers in this literature dealing with the personal income tax discuss methodological issues such as bunching strategies to estimate the elasticity (Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Saez, 2010) and mean reversion (Weber, 2014) . Matikka (2015) uses changes in municipal personal income tax rates in Finland as instruments, which is similar to our identification approach. Harju and Matikka (2016) distinguish between real responses and tax avoidance reactions of Finnish business owners. 2. The local taxing power, which determines the key allocations a municipality receives, is calculated by multiplying the local tax base times a standardized LBT rate (fiktiver Hebesatz), not the actual local LBT rate. Thus, in contrast to tax revenues, the taxing power does not mechanically change when a municipality adjusts its local tax rate, provided the tax base remains unchanged (see section 5.4). The intention is to assess the neediness of a municipality independently of the tax rate it sets.
The Tax-Rate Elasticity of Local Business Profits setting higher tax rates more attractive for a municipality, as the equalization partly compensates the municipality for the loss in the tax base. Thus, the horizontal externality of taxation is partly internalized. We demonstrate that the German local fiscal equalization scheme may partly explain why LBT rates have not been pushed down by tax competition in Germany, very much in contrast to the corporate tax rates in Germany and in most other European and OECD countries in the context of increasing globalization. There are only a few empirical studies on the responsiveness of business profits with respect to corporate or other business tax rates. Clausing (2007) , Devereux (2007) and Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) rely on country-level tax revenue data from OECD countries. It remains an open question if such cross-country studies can control sufficiently for differences between countries, such as differences in the definition of the corporate tax base and in other laws, institutions and cultural influences relevant for firms, which may also change over time in parallel to changes in tax rates. In particular, due to the very limited within-country variation in statutory tax rates at the country level, tax effects are typically not identified in these studies if country-fixed effects are taken into account (see Devereux, 2007) .
Buettner (2003, 2005) partly overcomes these problems using a panel of municipalities in the German federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg and exploiting variation in LBT rates. However, he only has access to tax revenue data. This may be problematic because in a given period, tax revenues generally differ from the taxes finally due for the same period, especially in the case of business taxes. In contrast, tax return data, as we use in this paper, contain the required information on assessed taxes. As we demonstrate in section 5.3, this issue may partly explain why Buettner (2003 Buettner ( , 2005 obtains very large point estimates of the elasticity of the LBT base with respect to the LBT rate of À1.3 to À1.4.
Three papers use firm-level micro data, but they deal with the national corporate income tax (CIT), not a LBT. Gruber and Rauh (2007) use a sample of financial statements from Compustat, which contains mainly large corporations in the United States, and estimate an elasticity of the CIT base with respect to the net-of-tax marginal CIT rate of 0.2. In contrast, we use administrative tax return data on the universe of firms in Germany, including small and medium-sized and unincorporated businesses. Devereux et al. (2014) estimate the responsiveness of the CIT base by analyzing bunching around kinks in the marginal tax rate schedule in the United Kingdom, using corporate tax records. They estimate elasticities of 0.13-0.17 around a kink at £300,000 and of 0.53-0.56 around a kink at £10,000.
Dwenger and Steiner (2012) construct a pseudo-panel from CIT return files in Germany by aggregating the data to the level of industries and federal states. They exploit variation in effective CIT rates, which is mainly due to differences in the amounts of losses carried forward, and estimate an elasticity of the CIT base with respect to the average corporate tax rate of À0.5. By analyzing the CIT, their analysis is confined to predominantly larger corporations, because small firms are often unincorporated in Germany. Furthermore, it is possible that local business profits respond more strongly to LBT rates than national corporate profits to nationwide corporate tax rates, because reallocation of business activity from one municipality to the other within the same country may be less costly than international reallocation, as mentioned above. Therefore, the lack of an estimate of the responsiveness of local business profits to LBT rates based on firm-level tax return data is an important omission in the literature, and this paper is a necessary complement to the existing studies dealing with the CIT.
Other articles analyze more specific effects of the LBT. Becker et al. (2012) consider the effect on the location decision of foreign multinational enterprises in Germany, and Buettner et al. (2011) analyze the effect on the strategic formation of consolidated tax groups. For policy-makers interested in tax revenues, the sum of these and any further effects influencing taxable local profits is relevant, which is captured by the elasticity of the LBT base. 3 For our analysis, we use the universe of administrative German LBT return files including almost one million firms with positive tax liabilities observed in 2001 and 2004. We estimate the tax rate elasticity of the LBT base using a multivariate IV regression after eliminating municipality fixed effects. To account for the endogeneity of the firm-specific tax rates, we use lagged municipality-specific statutory LBT rates as instruments. Thus, we use the heterogeneity of statutory tax rates and their changes over time to identify the effect of taxation.
In the following section 2, we describe the German LBT as a source of tax rate variation. Section 3 introduces the administrative firm-level tax return data, and section 4 describes our empirical methodology. Our estimation results are presented in section 5, including an analysis of heterogeneous effects. Comparing our results with those from the literature, we demonstrate that it is important to use tax return rather than tax revenue data. We also assess the effects of the fiscal equalization scheme. Section 6 concludes the analysis.
THE GERMAN LOCAL BUSINESS TAX AS A SOURCE OF TAX RATE VARIATION
The local business tax is the most important independent source of revenues for German municipalities. 4 All companies, corporations as well as unincorporated firms, are subject to the LBT in Germany. The tax base is determined in the same way all over Germany, because the rules are set by federal laws. The tax is mainly a tax on business profits. Some additions and reductions apply; most notably, in the period covered by our analysis, 2001-04, half of the interest expenses on long-term debt were added back to the tax base. The LBT is determined in two steps. In the first step, a basic tax rate that is uniform nationwide is applied in order to obtain the uniform basic tax. For corporations, a flat basic tax rate of 5% was applied in the period of analysis. Unincorporated firms benefitted from a tax free allowance of €24,500. For exceeding income, they faced a graduated schedule with increasing, piecewise constant marginal basic tax rates of 1%, 2%, 3%, and 4%, in four successive tax brackets of width €12,000 each, and 5% for 3. Fuest et al. (2015) and Siegloch (2014) also use the exogenous variation in statutory tax rates provided by the German LBT to estimate the wage incidence and employment effects of business taxes. 4. Municipalities are entitled to set their own tax rates for the LBT and two property taxes, but have no authority over any other taxes. LBT revenues were €43 billion in 2013, whereas the sum of revenues from the property taxes was only €12 billion (Federal Statistical Office, 2014).
The Tax-Rate Elasticity of Local Business Profits income exceeding €72,500. Subsequently, the uniform basic tax of companies operating in more than one municipality is allocated to the municipalities involved by formula apportionment, which is usually based on the payroll attributable to the subsidiaries. In the second step, the municipalities apply a tax rate multiplier, which they are entitled to determine within certain limits, to their allocated share of the uniform basic tax. 5 In 2004, a legal minimum multiplier of 200% was introduced, this was chosen by only 134 (out of 12,000) municipalities. The average multiplier was 385% in 2001 and 388% in 2004 (Federal Statistical Office, 2005 , with top multipliers reaching about 500% in both years. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the LBT multipliers in 2004. Thus, importantly for this analysis, the municipalities are free to choose the statutory LBT rate and change it anytime. Taking into account the graduated schedule for unincorporated firms, as well as the deductibility of the LBT from its own tax base as a business expense, the 5th and 95th percentiles of the average LBT rates applicable to firms with strictly positive tax liabilities in 2001 and 2004 were 0.3% and 18.2%.
The part of the variation in the firm-specific average LBT rates stemming from the allowance and the graduated tax schedule for unincorporated firms is endogenous in the tax base equation, because the profits of the firm determine the applicable tax bracket. In contrast, the variation due to different tax multipliers in the more than 12,000 municipalities in Germany and their changes over time can be used to identify the tax effects, as we discuss in section 4. Comparing 2001 and 2004, 2,652 municipalities increased their LBT multipliers (by 22 basis points on average, conditional on a positive increase), but only 254 municipalities decreased their multipliers (by 24.3 basis points on average), reflecting a trend toward higher LBT rates.
In addition to the LBT, corporations were subject to the CIT levied at the national level at a flat tax rate of 25% in the period under consideration. The tax base of the CIT is business profits and similar to the tax base of the LBT. Shareholders of unincorporated businesses pay a progressive PIT on their share of business profits, levied at the national level as well. In the period of analysis, the LBT was considered a business expense and as such deductible from the tax bases of the CIT, the PIT and its own LBT base. In addition, shareholders of unincorporated firms could credit 1.8 times the uniform basic tax against their PIT liability as long as this lump-sum amount did not exceed the PIT they had to pay for the corresponding business income. In 2008, after our period of analysis, the deductibility of the LBT as a business expense was abolished and the rules for crediting against the PIT liability were changed. 6 In the 1990s and 2000s, LBT rates exhibited an increasing trend (see Figure 2 for the average multiplier over all municipalities in Germany). This trend stands in sharp contrast to the German CIT rate, which was decreased significantly multiple times within the same time period from 50% for retained earnings in 1993 down to 15% since 2008, and in contrast to the trend of national CIT rates in 5. Each municipality sets only one multiplier that does not differ between corporations and unincorporated firms or by firm size. Thus, only the uniform basic tax rates for unincorporated firms applied in the first step are graduated. 6. See Fossen and Bach (2008) for more details.
most European and OECD countries. The literature commonly explains the decreasing trend in CIT rates by accelerating tax competition for increasingly mobile capital due to the intensifying globalization (e.g. Devereux et al., 2008) . Without further information, a tempting explanation for the opposing trend of the LBT rates could have been that the tax base were less elastic with respect to the LBT rate than with respect to the CIT rate, such that tax competition would be less relevant for the LBT. However, in this paper we empirically show that the elasticities with respect to the two tax rates are similar. Instead, we illustrate that the differing trends can be explained by the fiscal equalization scheme for German municipalities, which largely compensates municipalities for the loss in the tax base when they increase the LBT rate (section 5.4). Thus, the equalization scheme increases incentives for municipalities to raise local business taxes and mitigates tax competition for the local tax base.
ADMINISTRATIVE FIRM-LEVEL TAX RETURN AND MUNICIPALITY DATA
For our analysis, we use the universe of administrative individual tax return files for the German LBT for 2001 and 2004 (the years in between are unavailable). The data are provided by the Research Data Centers of the Federal and State Statistical Offices. The data contain all information necessary to calculate the LBT liability of a firm, e.g., profits, long term interest expenses, the asserted value of the firm's real estate, and the final assessed LBT base. Furthermore, the records report the municipality, the legal form and the industry of a firm. An advantage of the common nationwide statistics is that no issues of comparability arise, which plague cross-country studies of taxation effects. A disadvantage is that due to strict data protection laws, firm identifiers are unavailable, so we cannot construct firm-level panel data from the two cross-sections. However, we can control for municipality fixed effects. This is sufficient in our setting because the (lagged) statutory LBT rates, which we use as instrumental variables, only vary at the municipality, but not at the firm level (see section 4 for details). 7 We merge the data with official information about all German municipalities in these two years, which are provided by the Statistical Offices as well. These data inform about a municipality's LBT multiplier, population size and structure, the economic use of its area, and the local unemployment rate. Local GDP is available at the level of counties and independent cities. 8 We link the two data sources using information about a company's location, which is available in the tax return files.
To estimate the tax rate elasticity of the tax base, we only include firms with a strictly positive tax liability in the estimation sample. Firms that do not pay taxes because they make losses or because they are unincorporated and their profits are below the tax allowance are not included. This leaves us with 901,520 firms in 2001 and 937,056 firms in 2004. To account for possible nonrandom sample selection, in the estimations we control for the share of firms with a strictly positive tax liability in the firm's municipality. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of variables used in this analysis for 2001 and 2004, and Table 6 for the pooled data (including percentiles). The dependent variable, the LBT base, has a mean of about €70,000 (US$95,500 on 31 December 2004) in both years. This highlights the large number of small and medium sized firms and demonstrates the advantage of our data in comparison to collections of listed corporations, which are often used in the literature, because these are limited to large corporations and therefore very selective. The firm-specific average LBT rate over all firms has a mean of 6.5% in 2001 and 7. Because the firm size distribution is extremely skewed, we exclude the top 1% of observations in terms of the tax base, because these few very large companies would otherwise have a dominating impact on the conditional means to be estimated. 8. In the period of analysis, there were 116 independent cities in Germany, and the remaining municipalities belonged to 323 counties. The Tax-Rate Elasticity of Local Business Profits 6.7% in 2004. Again, this indicates that a high share of the firms are unincorporated and small and benefit from the graduated tax rate structure. The median firm in our sample is located in a municipality with 1,075 firms (Table 6) , while the average is about 10,000, which reflects the skewed distribution of municipality size. About 64% of the firms are sole proprietorships. Only 0.01% has operations in more than one municipality and are subject to formula apportionment. No more than 0.2% of the observations in the sample represent a consolidated tax group. The most frequent industry category is trade, maintenance and repair, followed by business service activities and construction. The median firm is located in a municipality with 28,000 inhabitants, but the average across firms is 272,000-277,000, again reflecting the skewed distribution. The shares of youths and elderly vary notably across municipalities, as indicated by the percentiles in Table 6 .
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To estimate the tax rate elasticity of the LBT base using our individual firm-level data, we specify the following log-log model equation:
where the indices i, m, and t refer to firms, municipalities, and observation years, respectively. The tax base is denoted by y, the firm-specific tax rate by s, and x k are control variables. In the model we distinguish between unobserved firm effects u, municipality effects v, and time effects w. The remaining error term is denoted ɛ. Among the coefficients b to be estimated, b 1 is the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate, which is of primary interest. 9 We use the firm-specific average tax rate s, calculated as the ratio of (assessed tax liability)/(assessed tax base) in the current period. This avoids making assumptions about future investment plans, which is necessary to calculate forward-looking measures of effective tax rates (cf. Devereux, 2004; Fullerton, 1984; Gordon et al., 2004) . A main motivation for using forward-looking measures of tax rates is to account for differences in the definition of tax bases in cross-country analyses. This is not relevant here, because the definition of the tax base is the same in all municipalities and does not change in the observation period. Our measure of the firm-specific average tax rate captures the tax multipliers set by the municipalities and the graduated tax rates schedule for unincorporated businesses, but not the rules for determining the tax base, which are the same for all observations. For example, if a firm uses tax deductions, this influences our measure of the firm's average tax rate the same way as reductions in its profits, i.e., by reducing the tax base and thus potentially moving the firm into a lower tax bracket. Our tax rate measure is thus different from a measure relating 9. Instead of estimating the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate, one could estimate the elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate, which is often done in the literature on the elasticity of the PIT. We follow the first approach to facilitate comparison with the literature on the elasticity of business income taxes (Buettner, 2003 (Buettner, , 2005 Dwenger and Steiner, 2012) . tax payments to gross economic profits (before tax deductions), which is often used when differences in the generosity of tax deduction rules across countries or time are the focus of analysis. Our approach allows us to focus on the effect of the tax multipliers and the tax schedule. Likewise, our measure of the LBT tax rate does not capture the deductibility of the LBT from the CIT and PIT (see section 2). In theory, average tax rates should be more relevant for extensive adjustments such as location decisions of firms, and marginal tax rates for intensive adjustments such as marginal investments (cf. Devereux and Griffith, 1998) . In our setting, it is not possible to identify these potential nuances, because in Germany, average and marginal LBT rates are identical for corporations and approximately identical for unincorporated firms with larger profits. We therefore use the average tax rate in the estimation of the LBT base elasticity.
It is important to account for municipality fixed effects such as the location and local infrastructure not changing between 2001 and 2004. OLS estimation of equation (1) would be expected to yield biased parameter estimates because of the omission of the municipality fixed effects, which are likely to be correlated with the tax rates as well as with firm profits. Therefore, we transform the data by subtracting the municipality means of all (independent and dependent) variables in 2001 from the corresponding variables in 2004. Because the mean of the municipality fixed effect v m over all firms in municipality m equals v m , this transformation eliminates the municipality fixed effect v m . This procedure leaves us with one transformed cross-section for the estimation. To account for potential correlation of error terms (especially unobserved firm effects) within municipalities, we calculate standard errors of estimated coefficients that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by municipality.
Even after the data transformation, OLS will yield biased coefficient estimates because of the endogeneity of the tax rate. The dependent variable, the tax base y, determines the tax bracket applicable to an unincorporated firm, and thus its firm-specific average tax rate. We account for this type of endogeneity by treating this tax rate as endogenous and using the second and third lags of the statutory tax rate of the firm's municipality as excluded instruments.
We define the statutory tax rate as the proportional tax rate applicable to a corporation, taking into account the uniform basic tax rate of 5%, the deductibility of the LBT from its own tax base as a business expense, and the municipality's tax multiplier. 10 Thus, variation in the statutory tax rate exclusively comes from variation in multipliers across municipalities and time. Endogenous variation stemming from the firm level due to the tax allowance and the graduated tax rates for unincorporated firms is excluded. Since the LBT is proportional for corporations, their marginal, average and statutory tax rates defined in this sense are equal, and this endogeneity problem does not arise. For unincorporated firms, the marginal and average tax rates approach the statutory tax rate for large profits, when the tax allowance and the graduated tax rates for small profits 10. Because of the deductibility of the LBT as a business expense, the LBT is calculated as tax = 0.05 (tax base À tax) multiplier/100. Rearranging this equation, we get the tax rate = tax/tax base = 0.05 multiplier/(100 + 0.05 multiplier). This is our formal definition of the statutory tax rate.
The Tax-Rate Elasticity of Local Business Profits become negligible. For unincorporated firms with smaller profits, where the endogeneity issue arises due to the progressive tax schedule, our measure of the firm-specific average tax rate differs from the instrument, the municipality-specific statutory tax rate, precisely in that the firm-specific tax rate captures the basic allowance and the graduated tax schedule, whereas the instrument does not. Even for unincorporated firms with small profits, there is still a (positive) correlation between our measures of the average and statutory tax rates, as required by the IV approach, because the municipality's tax multiplier is contained in both variables.
The statutory tax rate is expected to be exogenous to an individual firm and thus a valid instrument. However, one might argue that municipalities may adjust their tax multipliers as a reaction to changing profits of the firms in the municipality. Therefore, we use the second and third lags of the statutory tax rates as instruments instead of the contemporaneous statutory tax rate. 11 The statutory tax rate, which does not differ between firms within a municipality, is uncorrelated with the unobserved individual firm effects u i in the model after eliminating the unobserved municipality effects v m by the data transformation. Therefore, the omission of the unobserved firm effects is not expected to create a bias in the coefficient of the tax rate in the IV estimation. Furthermore, the IV approach accounts for potential measurement error.
We control for the following firm characteristics. As indicators of firm size, we use the assessed value of the firm's real estate, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is active in more than one municipality, and an interaction term between these two variables. The tax return data do not provide other indicators of firm size such as the sales volume or the number of employees. Furthermore, we include the legal form (dummies for partnership or corporation; sole proprietorship is the omitted base category), and a dummy indicating whether the observation represents a group with consolidated tax filing status. Moreover, we account for municipality characteristics. From the universe of the LBT files, we calculate the share of firms with strictly positive tax liability in each municipality, in order to control for selection into the estimation sample which, as mentioned above, only includes such firms. This variable also serves to control the local business cycle.
From the municipality statistics, we include the log population size and the population structure (shares of persons below 16 and above 64 years of age); these characteristics may change over time and may thus not be captured by the municipality fixed effects. We further control for the area size of a municipality, which may change over time as a result of administrative reforms, and the area sizes used for different purposes (for recreation; streets, paths and squares; and for agriculture). Shifts in the usage of area may indicate changing priorities in the municipality or structural change. In robustness checks, we additionally include the unemployment rate in the municipality and the GDP at the county 11. We also tried using lags further behind, but this led to a weak-instrument problem, as indicated by weak instruments tests. As we subtract the municipality means of all variables from t À 3 in the data transformation to eliminate the municipality fixed effects, it still cannot be ruled out entirely that the lagged instruments may be correlated with the transformed error term, if municipalities change their multipliers in reaction to changes in business profits; however, we expect this potential correlation to be negligible. level to control the local business cycle more stringently. 12 We do not include these variables in the main specification because unemployment and GDP (and even their time lags) might be endogenous and because we do not observe these variables for all municipalities.
ESTIMATION RESULTS

Main results
The first column of Table 2 presents the main results from the IV estimation of equation (1) after the data transformation that eliminates the unobserved municipality effects. All coefficients refer to those in equation (1) because the transformation leaves them unaffected. The consistently estimated elasticity of the LBT base with respect to the LBT rate is À0.45 and significant at the 1%-level. Thus, when a municipality increases its LBT rate by 1%, the firms active in the municipality reduce their local taxable profits by almost half a percent. Considering that the LBT is proportional for corporations and nearly proportional for unincorporated firms with large profits as well, one can infer that tax revenues increase by about 1 À 0.45 = 0.55% when the tax rate is increased by 1% (tax rate elasticity of tax revenues). This is consistent with the upward sloping side of the Laffer curve, where tax revenues grow when the tax rate is increased, but clearly less than proportionally. The F-statistic of joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first stage is 56.6, indicating that the instruments are strong. Hansen's overidentification test yields a p-value of above 80% and thus does not indicate a violation of the exogeneity assumption. Hausman's endogeneity test clearly confirms endogeneity of the tax rate and the necessity of IV estimation.
As a robustness check, in column (2) we include the local unemployment rate and GDP per capita as additional control variables. This reduces the number of observations somewhat due to missing values in these variables. The point estimate and significance of the tax rate elasticity as well as the tests of instrument strength and validity remain similar, which indicates that the results are robust. Local unemployment is negatively associated with the tax base, whereas county GDP has no significant effect. 13 To assess the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of the tax rate and unobserved municipality effects in the econometric estimation, in columns (3)-(5) we report results from na€ ıve estimators that we expect to be inconsistent. An IV estimation without the data transformation using the cross-sections of 2001 and 2004 leads to a less negative point estimate of the tax rate elasticity, indicating that failure to account for unobserved municipality effects leads to an upward bias, even though 12. We thank one of the referees for this suggestion. 13. As another robustness check, we re-estimate model (1), but include the average statutory tax rate of neighboring municipalities (within the same county) as an additional control variable. Like the own tax rate, we treat this variable as endogenous and instrument it with its second and third time lags. The point estimate of the coefficient of interest (the own tax rate elasticity of the tax base) is À0.2480 with a standard error of 0.1347 and is significant at the 10%-level. The confidence interval overlaps with the baseline estimate in column (1), so we conclude that the results are robust. The Hansen test of overidentification is passed (p = 0.208). We discuss the definition and potential influence of neighboring municipalities in more detail in section 5.3. 
(3) Notes: The dependent variable is the log tax base. Where indicated, municipality fixed effects are eliminated by a data transformation that subtracts the municipality mean in the preceding cross-section from all variables. In the IV estimations, the log tax rate is treated as endogenous, and the second and third lags of the statutory tax rate in the municipality are used as excluded instruments. Further controls included in all regressions: Recreational area, street area, agricultural area. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by municipality (across years). Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Source:
Local business tax statistics and municipality data for 2001 and 2004 from the Statistical Offices.
The Tax-Rate Elasticity of Local Business Profits we control for federal state dummies instead here. This is intuitive, because municipalities with large LBT rates tend to be attractive business locations from a nontax perspective because of productive amenity factors, and they therefore tend to host profitable firms (examples include Munich, Hamburg, and Frankfurt). This positive cross-sectional correlation between high profits and high tax rates biases the estimated coefficient of the tax rate upward. The causal effect of the tax rate on profits can only be identified when appropriately isolating it from the unobserved effects of the municipality. The IV estimation alone is insufficient, because the instruments, lagged statutory tax rates, are fully exogenous only when the unobserved municipality effects are eliminated from the error term. The two right-most columns show results from OLS estimations with and without the data transformation to eliminate the municipality effects. Here, we find an even stronger upward bias of the estimated coefficients, such that these become significantly positive. This bias is explained by the fact that for unincorporated firms, which face a graduated tax rates schedule, the tax base determines the tax bracket they fall into and thus the tax rate that is applied. Higher profits shift firms into brackets with higher tax rates, leading to a positive correlation. Treating the firm-specific average tax rate as endogenous and using lagged statutory tax rates as instruments in the IV regressions ensures that only the exogenous variation in the tax rates on the level of the municipalities is used for identification. 14
Heterogeneity in tax responsiveness
In this section, we explore if the tax rate elasticity of the tax base differs by firm types. Differences in tax responsiveness between types of firms may arise due to differences in mobility at the intensive margin (incremental investments) or extensive margin (location decisions). Different types of firms may also differ in their ability and willingness to engage in tax avoidance and evasion. We split the data by legal form, industry sector, and firm size, and run our preferred IV estimator with eliminated municipality fixed effects on the subsamples. The results appear in Table 3 . We include the same control variables as before, but only report the elasticity of interest.
We first summarize the results and discuss them subsequently. Unincorporated firms, i.e., sole proprietorships and partnerships, exhibit a significantly stronger responsiveness to taxation than corporations, which do not significantly react to changes in LBT rates. 15 While the tax rate elasticity is significantly negative for all sectors, firms in the tertiary (services) sector respond more strongly than firms 14. In comparison to the consistent estimations in the first two columns, three significant control variables switch sign when not eliminating the municipality fixed effects in the IV or OLS regressions: The log number of firms in the municipality, the elderly share, and the interaction between the real estate value and the indicator of a multi-municipal firm. This again indicates that the estimates without eliminating the municipality fixed effects are significantly biased and reflect crosssectional correlations between the control variables and firm profits rather than causal effects. This finding further stresses the importance of eliminating the municipality fixed effects. 15. In the subsample of corporations, endogeneity of the firm-specific average tax rate because of a graduated tax rates schedule does not arise, because the LBT is proportional for corporations. We still use the second and third lags of the statutory tax rate as IV for the contemporaneous tax rate to alleviate the potential concern that municipalities may adjust their LBT rates in response to changes in the profits of the local firms.
in the primary (agricultural) and secondary (manufacturing) sector. 16 Finally, we use the value of a firm's real estate as an indicator of firm size. As mentioned above, sales or employment figures are unavailable in our data, and we cannot use profits as an indicator of firm size, because they are endogenous in the tax base equation. Thus, we define larger and smaller firms as firms with a real estate value above or below the median. The results show that smaller firms exhibit a stronger reaction than larger firms, whose elasticity is insignificant. The first stage F-statistics indicate strong instruments except for the group of larger firms according to the real estate value. The null hypothesis of Hansen's overidentification test must be rejected at the 10%-level in one of the six estimations concerning the primary and secondary sector (p-value: 8%). The estimations for these sectors and for large firms must therefore be interpreted with caution. The finding that unincorporated firms respond more strongly to local business taxation than corporations is surprising, because unincorporated firms can partly credit their LBT liability against their PIT, in contrast to corporations (see section 2). Most of the unincorporated firms are sole proprietorships (Table 1) , which are usually smaller than corporations. The effect of the legal form may thus reflect the effect of firm size. Similarly, service firms are often smaller than manufacturing companies, so the three sample splits deliver a consistent picture. It may be easier for smaller firms in the services sector to move activity in response to taxation in comparison to larger manufacturing corporations because the former are relatively flexible in renting offices in other municipalities, whereas manufacturing plants have more immobile fixed assets and higher sunk Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the log tax rate from IV regressions with the log tax base as the dependent variable and including the same control variables as in Table 2 , based on sub-samples as indicated in the first column. Municipality fixed effects are eliminated by a data transformation that subtracts the municipality mean in the preceding cross-section from all variables. The log tax rate is treated as endogenous, and the second and third lags of the statutory tax rate in the municipality are used as excluded instruments. Larger firms are those with above median real estate holdings, smaller firms below median. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by municipality (across years). Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Source: Local business tax statistics and municipality data for 2001 and 2004 from the Statistical Offices.
16. We combine the primary and secondary sectors because the agricultural sector is very small in Germany.
The Tax-Rate Elasticity of Local Business Profits costs attached to a certain location, at least in the short run. Another possible explanation why smaller firms react more strongly to taxation may be that their owner-managers use their direct influence to minimize their tax payment. In contrast, the hired management of larger corporations may be more alert to before-tax performance measures, especially if the shareholders are a diverse mix of personal, corporate and institutional shareholders, perhaps from different countries, with divergent tax incentives. These issues are almost unexplored in the extant literature, which predominantly uses financial statements data from large corporations and mostly neglects small, unincorporated firms. Our finding that the LBT base of corporations does not react significantly to the LBT rate contrasts with the results of the micro data analyses of Gruber and Rauh (2007) for the United States, Dwenger and Steiner (2012) for Germany, and Devereux et al. (2014) for the United Kingdom, which find significant elasticities of the CIT base with respect to the CIT rate. However, the results are not contradictory, because together they suggest that corporations in general respond more strongly to corporate income taxes, whereas unincorporated firms respond to local business taxes. Our results do not contradict findings by Becker et al. (2012) and Buettner et al. (2011) either, who report that multi-municipal and multinational enterprises respond to LBT rates by profit shifting and location choice, respectively, because these specific enterprises comprise only a small fraction of all corporations.
Tax return data vs. tax revenue data
Our estimated elasticity of the LBT base with respect to the LBT rate of À0.45, which we obtain for the full sample, is substantially smaller in absolute terms than the estimates by Buettner (2003 Buettner ( , 2005 on the basis of aggregated data at the municipality level for the German federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. One reason for his much larger point estimates of À1.3 to À1.4 is that by using data aggregated to the municipality level, he cannot account for the progressive tax schedule for unincorporated firms. Buettner (2003) estimates that this leads to an overestimation of no more than 26%, so this can only explain a part of the difference to our estimate. To assess if the remaining difference occurs due to aggregation bias, we aggregate our data to the level of the municipality as well. Specifically, we construct a pseudo-panel and ensure that each observation consists of at least 50 firms by further combining municipalities within the same county if at least one of the municipalities has less than 50 firms. Buettner (2003) also tests whether tax rates of neighboring municipalities influence the local tax base. Tax competition implies that one might expect lower tax rates in neighboring municipalities to decrease the local tax base because some local firm activity moves away. However, Buettner (2003) finds that the average tax rate of neighboring municipalities is insignificant in the baseline regression of the tax base; only interactions with the relative population size are significant in supplementary regressions. Buettner (2005) then omits the tax rates of neighboring municipalities and finds a very similar point estimate for the own tax rate elasticity of the tax base. For comparison, we also estimate a specification that includes the average statutory tax rate of neighboring municipalities. As neighbors, we define all other municipalities that are located within F. M. Fossen and V. Steiner the same county as the focal municipality. 17 Like the own tax rate, we also treat the average statutory tax rate of the neighbors as endogenous and use their second and third time lags as instruments.
When we use our pseudo panel on the municipality level, the analog to the estimation approach based on the firm-level data would be a combination of a municipality fixed effects and IV estimator. However, with the aggregated data, tests of IV relevance indicate that our instruments, the lagged statutory LBT rates, become statistically weak when using the fixed effects estimator. 18 Therefore, we estimate IV regressions based on the pooled aggregated cross-sections. We use the same instruments as in the micro data estimations, i.e., the second and third lags of the statutory tax rates. In column (1) of Table 4 , the null hypothesis of the Hansen overidentification test is rejected, which presumably indicates endogeneity of the second lag in this particular estimation, perhaps due to aggregation bias. Therefore, in column (2), we repeat this estimation, but only use the third lag as IV.
In columns (1)-(3) of Table 4 , which are based on tax return data, our point estimate of the own tax rate elasticity of the tax base becomes smaller in absolute terms compared to our baseline estimate (column (1) of Table 2 ), as it did before in our IV estimation without accounting for municipality effects (column (3) of Table 2 ), but here the estimates are still significantly different from zero. The average tax rate of the neighboring municipalities is insignificant (column (3) of Table 4 ), like in Buettner (2003) , and the elasticity with regard to the own tax rate is robust to the inclusion of this variable. 19 A possible explanation is that municipalities do not mainly compete with their geographical neighbors, but also with distant municipalities inside and outside Germany; this suggests an interesting avenue for future research. Regarding the comparison of the estimated own tax rate elasticity with the corresponding estimate reported by Buettner (2003 Buettner ( , 2005 , the important insight is that aggregation does not explain his substantially larger point estimate.
Another candidate explanation of the differing results concerning to the own tax rate elasticity is the measure of the tax base. Since Buettner (2003 Buettner ( , 2005 only has access to tax revenue data on the municipal level, he obtains his measure of the LBT base by dividing LBT revenues by the LBT rate. These tax revenues are cash tax collections by a municipality in a given year, they are not 17. For independent cities, which do not belong to counties, we define all other independent cities within the same administrative district as neighbors. For Germany's three city states, we use the average tax rate in Germany excluding the focal city state. Our definition of neighbors is similar to the 'county matrix' used in Borck et al. (2015) and in line with Janeba and Osterloh (2013) , who argue that urban centers compete with other centers, whereas smaller municipalities only compete locally. 18. When we apply the fixed effects estimator without instruments on the pseudo-panel data, we obtain a positive and significant estimate of the own LBT rate elasticity of 0.2809 (SE = 0.0153), similar to the result in column (4) of Table 2 . These estimators without IV are inconsistent because they do not account for the endogeneity of the tax rate due to the progressive tax schedule. The positive bias without IV arises because the average LBT rate is larger in municipalities where more unincorporated firms have larger tax bases and therefore face higher tax rates. 19. In this regression, which includes two endogenous regressors, we additionally use Shea's Partial R 2 to check the strength of the instruments. The statistic is larger than 8% for both variables and thus is acceptable.
The Tax-Rate Elasticity of Local Business Profits based on tax return data. This may be problematic, because business taxes are usually not fully paid in the same year that they are assessed for. During the year, only approximate prepayments are collected. Then the tax is assessed in the following year, usually leading to subsequent payments of taxes or tax refunds. In case of business taxes, corrections of tax payments often occur even years later. To assess the relevance of this issue, we construct a new measure of the tax base by dividing tax revenue data by tax rates on the municipal level, as in Buettner (2003 Buettner ( , 2005 . Column (4) of Table 4 shows that this procedure results in a large point estimate in absolute terms, very similar to the estimates of Buettner (2003 Buettner ( , 2005 . Thus, we conclude that using tax revenue data instead of the more appropriate tax return data leads to a significant bias in the estimated elasticity away from zero. This may be explained by the higher volatility of tax revenues in comparison to assessed taxes. Presumably, when the tax rate is increased, firms exaggerate when they report the reduction in their expected tax base for the coming year to the tax administration in order to push through lower prepayments. This finding may have implications for a large number of cross-country analyses using aggregated tax revenue data, for example from the OECD tax revenue statistics, which are partly recorded on a cash basis. Calculating an approximate tax base from revenue data to estimate tax rate elasticities may lead to biased results. Notes: Pseudo-panel IV regressions on the municipality level. The dependent variable is the log tax base, which in the first three columns is aggregated from the individual firms' tax bases, whereas it is calculated back from the aggregated municipality tax revenues in column (4). The own and neighboring log tax rates are treated as endogenous, and the lags of the respective statutory tax rates, which are indicated in the column header, are used as excluded instruments. The regressions include the same control variables as in Table 2 . Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by municipality (across years). Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Source: Local business tax statistics and municipality data for 2001 and 2004 from the Statistical Offices.
Fiscal equalization and the elasticity of municipalities' budgets
To calculate how a German municipality's total budget changes when it adjusts its LBT rate, one has to take into account the fiscal equalization scheme (see, e.g., Buettner, 2005) . For simplicity, in this section, we treat the LBT as a proportional tax, which is exactly true for corporations and approximately true for large unincorporated firms as well. Because these firms dominate total revenues, this simplification is appropriate here, where we are interested in total revenues. Then a municipality's total budget after fiscal equalization, a, can be written in a stylized way as
The LBT rate in the municipality is denoted t and the LBT base is b, so tb is the LBT revenue before fiscal equalization. The next two summands describe fiscal equalization, where the first represents the general contribution of the municipality to the equalization scheme (Umlage), and the second the key allocations it receives (Schl€ usselzuweisungen). To calculate the general contribution, one applies the standardized LBT rate t, which is the average rate in the federal state, to the municipality's tax base, and multiplies by a marginal compensation rate a set by the federal state for all municipalities. The key allocations are determined by applying the standardized rate t to the gap between the standardized LBT base b, which is the average per capita tax base in the federal state multiplied by the municipality's population size, and the municipality's actual tax base. This gap reflects the under or overperformance of the municipality. The factor b is another marginal compensation rate set by the federal state, which determines by how much these differences in performance are equalized. High marginal compensation rates a and b imply a stronger fiscal equalization; if they are zero, there is no equalization at all. Finally, x summarizes all sources of a municipality's revenues other than local business taxes such as property taxes, allocated tax revenues from the PIT and the VAT as well as state-allocated grants.
From equation (2), the elasticity of a municipality's total budget with respect to the LBT rate is derived as follows:
The term in square brackets is the elasticity of the LBT revenues after fiscal equalization, which differs from one plus the elasticity of the LBT base db dt t b due to the fiscal equalization scheme. This term must be multiplied by the share of LBT revenues (before equalization) in the municipality's total budget, tb/a, to obtain the elasticity of the total budget. To illustrate the effect of the equalization scheme, we compare Hesse, a federal state with a comparably weak fiscal equalization scheme, to North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), a state with strong equalization. 20 In each state, we consider a stylized municipality with the average share 20. Reasons for the differences in the institutions of the federal states may be differences in local administration and spatial structures, socio-economic characteristics, and preferences (Buettner et al., 2008, p. 91) . Hesse implements minimum key allocations neglected in formula (2) for simplicity, which effectively increase equalization in this federal state as well.
of LBT revenues in the total budget and the average LBT rate in their state, so t and t are the same in these calculations. Table 5 shows the parameters used for the calculations and the elasticities of interest. For both states, we insert the elasticity of the LBT base of À0.45 estimated in the previous section. Thus, without fiscal equalization, the elasticity of LBT revenues would be 1À0.45 = 0.55. However, the elasticity of LBT revenues after fiscal equalization (the term in square brackets) is 0.88 for the average municipality in Hesse and 0.98 in NRW. Hence, the decrease in the tax base resulting from an increase in the tax rate is compensated by fiscal equalization to a large extent in Hesse and almost completely in NRW. In NRW, a 1% increase in the tax rate almost leads to a 1% increase in tax revenues after fiscal equalization, despite the sizable reduction in local business profits. 21 These calculations demonstrate that the fiscal equalization scheme greatly reduces a municipality's incentive to undercut its neighbors' LBT rates, because after equalization it benefits very little from extracting the tax base from other municipalities. Thus, tax competition for the LBT base among municipalities is largely mitigated by fiscal equalization in Germany. This may explain why municipalities increased their LBT rates during the 1990s and 2000s against the trend of decreasing CIT rates in Germany and European as well as other OECD countries, which have experienced increasing international tax competition for mobile capital due to accelerating globalization.
Thus, the fiscal equalization scheme partly internalizes the horizontal externality of the LBT and may help to prevent inefficiently low tax rates, as also noted by Egger et al. (2010) . However, there is also a vertical externality which may lead to inefficiently high tax rates, because municipalities do not take into account that the national level collects less revenues from the CIT and PIT if 21. Finally, taking into account the share of LBT revenues in the total budget of an average municipality, we obtain elasticities of a municipality's total budget with respect to the LBT rate of 0.20 in Hesse and 0.17 in NRW (Table 5 ).
nationwide taxable business profits fall due to an increase in LBT rates (and are not only shifted from one municipality to the other within Germany). In addition, the total budget available for equalization payments within a federal state also shrinks in this case, of course. The vertical fiscal externality is amplified by the partial tax deductibility of the LBT from the CIT and PIT bases before 2008 and the credit against the PIT, which may thus have contributed to increasing LBT rates.
CONCLUSION
We have estimated the elasticity of the LBT base with respect to the LBT rate in Germany, using the variation in tax rates over the more than 12,000 municipalities and over time for identification. The estimate for all firms is À0.45, which indicates that local business profits within a municipality fall by 0.45% if the municipality increases its LBT rate by 1%. This implies an elasticity of LBT revenues of about 0.55 and is consistent with the upward sloping side of the Laffer curve: When a municipality reduces its LBT rate, the growing LBT base self-finances about half of the mechanical revenue loss that the tax cut would imply if there were no behavioral response (before fiscal equalization). Our analysis further shows that smaller firms that tend to be unincorporated and in the services sector are most responsive to LBT rates. Large corporations do not respond significantly to LBT rates; they may primarily focus on the CIT rate.
On average across all firms, our preferred estimate of the LBT base elasticity is within the range obtained by related studies for the CIT using tax return data for Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, it is substantially below, in absolute value, the estimates obtained in previous studies on the LBT for Germany based on aggregate revenue data at the level of municipalities. We have shown that this difference cannot be explained by potential aggregation bias. Rather, calculating an approximate tax base from tax revenue (cash) data seems to result in a significant bias of the estimated elasticity away from zero. This should be considered when using country-level revenue data, for example the OECD tax revenue statistics, as is common in the empirical literature on the revenue effects of corporate taxation. To obtain unbiased estimates of the tax base elasticity, tax return (accrual) data should be used.
As we find a relatively strong decline of local taxable business profits in response to an increase in LBT rates, one might expect that tax competition among municipalities for the local tax base would lead to a race to the bottom of LBT rates. 22 However, LBT rates increased in the 1990s and 2000s, in contrast to CIT rates in Germany and most European and OECD countries, which have moved downward, presumably due to increasing international tax competition. We demonstrate that the different trend of the LBT rates may be partially explained by the German fiscal equalization scheme, which largely compensates 22. For example, for local tax competition in Switzerland, see Feld and Reulier (2008) . municipalities for the loss in the local tax base when they increase LBT rates, and therefore mitigates local tax competition. On the one hand, this way the fiscal equalization scheme may lead to a partial internalization of horizontal external effects between municipalities. These arise when a tax rate change in one municipality induces firms to move local taxable profits from one municipality to the other and thus affects tax revenues of other municipalities as well. Our relatively large elasticity estimate implies that such externalities would be sizable in the absence of a fiscal equalization scheme. On the other hand, the equalization scheme may intensify vertical externalities, because municipalities do not take into account that shrinking nationwide taxable business profits as a result of higher LBT rates also lead to lower CIT revenues on the national level.
The significant elasticity of the LBT base we estimate strongly suggests that welfare effects of local business taxation are important. This calls for further theoretical and empirical research in this area that should in particular investigate different adjustment channels of firms, spatial interactions, and interactions of the LBT with other taxes. A promising avenue to proceed would be to link together tax return data for the different taxes involved as well as financial accounts data, but this is currently infeasible in Germany due to data protection rules.
